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 THE POWER-TRUST CYCLE IN GLOBAL HEALTH:  




Trust between actors is vital to delivering positive health outcomes, while relationships of 
power determine health agendas, whose voices are heard and who benefits from global health 
initiatives. However, the relationship between trust and power has been neglected in the 
literatures on both international politics and global health. We examine this relationship 
through a study of relations between faith based organisations (FBO) and donors in Malawi 
and Zambia, drawing on 66 key informant interviews with actors central to delivering health 
care. From these two cases we develop an understanding of ‘trust as belonging’, which we 
define as the exercise of discretion accompanied by the expression of shared identities. Trust 
as belonging interacts with power in what we term the ‘power-trust cycle’, in which various 
forms of power undergird trust, and trust augments these forms of power. The power-trust 
cycle has a critical bearing on global health outcomes, affecting the space within which both 
local and international actors jockey to influence the ideologies that underpin global health, 
and the distribution of crucial resources. We illustrate how the power-trust cycle can work in 
both positive and negative ways to affect possible cooperation, with significant implications 
for collective responses to global health challenges. 
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THE POWER-TRUST CYCLE IN GLOBAL HEALTH:  
TRUST AS BELONGING IN RELATIONS OF DEPENDENCY  
 
This article investigates the power-trust relations between actors central to delivering health 
in Africa: donors and local faith-based organisations (FBOs). Understanding these relations is 
crucial to global health where weak African health systems face severe resource limitations, 
the world’s greatest health challenges and there is enduring public distrust.1 Many African 
states rely on development assistance for health (DAH), FBO health providers fill vast gaps 
in state capacities, and the West’s history of scientific exploitation contributes to continued 
scepticism about donor intentions.2 This paper is based on several years of fieldwork in 
Zambia and Malawi, and although we did not start our inquiries intending to focus on trust, 
trust and the complex ways it intertwines with power emerged from our interviews as 
fundamental to health diplomacy and health outcomes. And yet, analysis of power-trust 
relations is neglected in the IR and global health literatures.  
 This article makes three contributions. First, bringing multi-faceted power relations to 
the study of trust in IR problematises the established relationships between uncertainty, 
vulnerability and trust. The trust literature has not engaged fully with the question of power, 
often conceptualising trust and power as ‘functional equivalents’3 and using trust to push 
back against purely power-based accounts of international politics. Highly asymmetric power 
relations such as those between donors and aid recipients have fallen outside of trust 
explorations in IR and yet these types of relations and actors are part of the conduct of 
international politics and are central to global health. Rather than deciding that such actors 
are outside the study of trust because of their dependency, we advance existing research by 
examining how trust interacts with power in such circumstances. Our analysis of FBO-donor 
relations in health diplomacy enables us to conceptualise a trust in international politics that 
extends beyond the inter-state and conditions of anarchy to account for actors of objectively 
 
1 Amy Patterson, Africa and Global Health Governance (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2018); Paul Richards, Esther Mokuwa, Pleun Welmers, Harro Maat, and Ulrike Beisel, ‘Trust, and distrust, of 
Ebola Treatment Centers’, PloS One 14:12 (2019), e022451. 
2 Johanna Crane, Scrambling for Africa: AIDS, Expertise and the Rise of American Health Science (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2013); Melissa Graboyes, The Experiment Must Continue (Athens, OH: Ohio 
University, 2015). 
3 Guido Möllering, ‘Connecting trust and power’, Journal of Trust Research, 9:1 (2019), pp.1-5, p.1; see 
Reinhard Bachmann, ‘Trust, power and control in trans-organizational relations’, Organization Studies, 22:2 
(2001), pp.337-65; Lucy Gilson, ‘Trust and the development of health care as a social institution,’ Social 
Science and Medicine, 56 (2003), pp.1453–68. 
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unequal power and expose how trust interacts with power.  We develop the concept of ‘trust 
as belonging’, which we define as the exercise of discretion accompanied by the expression 
of shared identities. Attention to FBOs —institutions that emphasize a spiritual mission and 
‘otherworldly calling’— allows us to highlight the deep foundations for belonging. 
Second, we contribute to the literature debating the various forms of power in global 
health4 through understanding how power interacts with trust. We know that power and trust 
matter for health diplomacy since they shape collaborative relationships, policy development, 
and health outcomes. Pfeiffer highlights that when trust breaks down (or was never 
established), projects tend to fail. He draws attention to how trust has implications for power, 
since it may prevent abuses that advantage some over others, generate more equitable access 
to resources, and give dependent states and actors greater sovereign control over health 
initiatives.5  By examining African non-state actors that are not typically considered to be 
powerful but are nevertheless crucial in political change and development,6 we augment 
knowledge on health diplomacy, a field that foregrounds a plethora of new actors working at 
multiple levels from inter-state negotiations to multi-stakeholder, national diplomacy.7 We 
focus on FBOs as one type of non-state actor, because they provide half of health care 
services in some African countries, and they receive millions of dollars in DAH annually.8 
Donors also tend to view FBOs as relatively trustworthy actors,9 making them a crucial 
avenue through which to understand the confluence of power and trust. Through our analysis 
we develop the ‘power-trust cycle’ to account for how various forms of power undergird the 
vulnerabilities and competencies that matter for trust and how trust can, in turn, augment 
various forms of power. 
 
4 Suerie Moon, ‘Power in global governance’, Global Health, 15:74 (2019), p.6; Veena Sriram, Stephanie M. 
Topp, Marta Schaaf, Arima Mishra, Walter Flores, Subramania Raju Rajasulochana, and Kerry Scott, ‘10 best 
resources on power in health policy and systems in low- and middle-income countries’, Health Policy and 
Planning, 33 (2018), pp.611–21; Jeremy Shiffman, ‘Knowledge, moral claims and the exercise of power in 
global health’, International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 3:6 (2014), pp.297-9.  
5 James Pfeiffer, ‘International NGOs and primary health care in Mozambique’, Social Science & 
Medicine, 56:4 (2003): 725-38, pp.735-6. 
6 Emma-Louise Anderson and Amy Patterson, Dependent Agency in the Global Health Regime (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2016); Jennifer Clapp, ‘Africa, NGOs, and the international toxic waste trade’, Journal of 
Environment and Development, 3:2 (1994), pp.17-46. 
7 Rebecca Katz, Sarah Kornblet, Grace Arnold, Eric Lief, and Julie Fischer, ‘Defining health 
diplomacy’, Milbank Quarterly, 89:3 (2011), pp.503-23; Iona Kickbusch, Gaudenz Silberschmidt, and Paulo 
Buss, Global Health Diplomacy (Geneva: WHO, 2008); Ilona Kickbusch and Mihály Kökény, ‘Global health 
diplomacy’, Bulletin of the WHO, 91:3 (2013), p.159. 
8 Alyson Lipsky, ‘Evaluating the strength of faith’, Public Administration and Development, 31:1 (2011), pp.25-
36. 
9 Amy Patterson, The Church and AIDS in Africa (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2011). 
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Finally, we move beyond analysis of asymmetrical donor-local relations based on 
donor control of development assistance to recognise how donors and local actors 
simultaneously possess multiple, interconnected forms of power.10 Here we understand power 
as ‘the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of 
actors to determine their circumstances and fate’.11 This has significance for debates in 
international development about state capacity and institution building12 because it enables us 
to better account for the ways that donors extend their power and how local actors – often 
perceived as weak or powerless – exert influence.13 We find local actors use institutional, 
epistemic, and normative power to leverage trust and, in turn, leverage trust to offset and 
mediate the structures of dependency.  
This paper is set out as follows. Section one develops our conceptualisation of trust as 
belonging to account for trust in relations of dependency. Section two explains the elements 
of power that are manifest in donor-local relations in health diplomacy. Section three details 
our methods. Section four analyses trust as belonging in FBO-donor relations and 
demonstrates how power undergirds trust and trust augments power in a power-trust cycle. 
The paper concludes by challenging global health actors to recognise the consequences of the 
power-trust cycle, and highlighting the potential for its transformation through donor-local 
efforts to nurture trust as belonging.   
 
TRUST AS BELONGING IN RELATIONS OF DEPENDENCY 
 
The majority of IR trust literature assumes that the international realm has unique barriers to 
trust because of the condition of anarchy and the ensuing security imperatives placed on 
states.14 Booth and Wheeler pose a question that sums up much of the existing research: 
‘How can actors learn to trust each other - should they? - in a condition of anarchy?’15 This 
 
10 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in international politics’, International Organization, 59:1 
(2005), 39-75, p.41. 
11 Ibid, p.42. 
12 Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock, Building State Capability (London: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), p.288. 
13 Radhika Gore and Richard Parker, ‘Analysing power and politics in health policies and systems’, Global 
Public Health, 14 (2019), pp.481–8; James Scott, Weapons of the Weak (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1985). 
14 Exceptions include Torsten Michel, ‘Time to get emotional’, European Journal of International Relations, 
19:4 (2012), pp.869-90; Karen Fierke, ‘Terrorism and trust in Northern Ireland’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 
2:3 (2009), pp.497-51; Laura Considine, ‘Back to the rough ground!’ A grammatical approach to trust and 
international relations’, Millennium 40:4 (2015), pp.109-27. 
15 Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, The Security Dilemma (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.231. 
See also Vincent Keating and Jan Ruzicka, ‘Trusting relationships in international politics’, Review of 
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question binds the study of trust to a set of international actors (notably the state) that, at least 
in theory, make decisions as more-or-less equal agents in a context of anarchy.16 While the 
literature does not ignore power asymmetries between states, the role of institutions, or the 
links between trust and interdependence,17 it views dependency as the outcome of trust,18 as 
state actors make ‘wilful decisions’ to trust or distrust.19 The IR literature thus ignores the 
potential for trust within relations of dependency. This establishes a set of relations and 
contexts for trust in international politics that has several impacts. Firstly, it encourages a 
focus on inter-state relations. Even research grounded in social or cognitive psychology, for 
example, explains the tendency to trust as ‘anarchical social capital’.20 
Secondly, the anarchy problematic reproduces particular meanings and relationships 
for core elements of trust: uncertainty and vulnerability.21 Anarchy ‘magnifies the impact of 
uncertainty about the motives of others’ and implicitly limits it to uncertainty about state 
actions.22 For example, rational choice accounts of trust explain uncertainty in terms of 
distinguishing between status quo and revisionist states.23 Others understand uncertainty as 
discerning the peaceful intentions of states,24 or through the dynamics of the security 
dilemma.25 Similarly, the literature emphasises that anarchy compounds the vulnerability that 
comes with trusting under circumstances of uncertainty. Work on trusting relationships 
argues that such relationships require either the willing acceptance of vulnerability,26 or a 
lack of felt awareness of vulnerability and thus a lack of hedging behaviour.27 This position 
assumes a level of capacity either to accept vulnerability or hedge against it, as well as a 
 
International Studies, 40:4 (2014), p.755; Brian Rathbun, Trust in International Cooperation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.6. 
16 Michel, ‘Time to get emotional’, p.884.  
17 Brian Rathbun, ‘It takes all types: Social psychology, trust, and the international relations paradigm in our 
minds,’ International Theory, 1:3 (2009), pp.345-80. 
18 Niklas Luhman, Trust and Power (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979). 
19 Torsten Michel, ‘Trust, rationality and vulnerability in international relations’, in Amanda Beattie and Kate 
Schick, (eds.) The Vulnerable Subject (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp.86-109, p.98. 
20 Brian Rathbun, ‘Before hegemony: Generalized trust and the creation and design of international security 
organizations,’ International Organization, 65:2 (2011), pp.243–73.  
21 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma. 
22 Jan Ruzicka and Vincent Keating, ‘Going global: Trust research and international relations,’ Journal of Trust 
Research, 5 (2015), p.3.  
23 Andrew Kydd, ‘Trust building, trust breaking’, International Organization, 55:4 (2001), p.810.  
24 Nicholas Wheeler, ‘Beyond Waltz’s nuclear world: More trust may be better’, International Relations, 23:3 
(2009), pp.428–45. 
25 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma; Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Nicholas Wheeler, ‘Investigating diplomatic 
transformations’, International Affairs, 89:2 (2013), pp.477–96. 
26 Aaron Hoffman, ‘A conceptualization of trust in international relations’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 8:3 (2002), pp.375-401. 
27 Vincent Keating and Jan Ruzicka, ‘Trusting relationships in international politics’, Review of International 
Studies, 40:4 (2014), pp.753–70. 
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specific understanding of the nature of vulnerability, which is not always appropriate once 
one moves outside the inter-state level. For example, local health providers in Malawi 
experience multiple acute vulnerabilities and may lack any hedging capacity. Vulnerability is 
not always something such actors can choose to accept or ignore. We either can decide that 
these actors are outside the study of trust in IR or we can supplement current research with 
work that examines what trust means in these contexts. Existing conceptions of the trust-
uncertainty-vulnerability dynamic do not allow for studying trust in highly asymmetric power 
relations and therefore do not unpack questions of power, instead understanding relations of 
power/dominance as alternatives to relations of trust in the facilitation of cooperation.28  
The assumption of anarchy and its effects on vulnerability and uncertainty remain 
constant across both strategic and moral approaches to trust.29 Strategic trust assumes actors 
decide to trust based on information that one party has about another being potentially 
trustworthy (i.e. cooperative). Potentially trusting actors are rational egoists reacting to 
varying incentives to cooperate in situations of uncertainty.30 Work that has contested the 
strategic approach argues that trust involves not just the expectation of a potential trustee’s 
cooperative preferences or behaviour but also that any cooperation is based on a conviction of 
the benevolence of the trustee, not just incentive/assurance structures. Trust requires a 
‘human factor’31 and a conviction that the other will ‘do what is right’.32 This literature roots 
trust in conditions that include emotions, personal ties, generalised expectations of moral 
behaviour, common identities, or interpersonal interactions.33 
We conceptualise trust in two parts. The first is the ‘exercise of [discretion] by some 
agent (individual or artificial) on behalf of another over matters that the trusting agent cares 
about’.34 The focus on the exercise of discretion places trust in the act of trusting rather than 
in the belief that the other is trustworthy. This view understands trust as ‘the generic name for 
 
28 Cynthia Hardy, Nelson Phillips and Thomas Lawrence, ‘Distinguishing trust and power in inter-
organizational relations’, in Christel Lane and Reinhard Bachmann, (eds.) Trust Within and Between 
Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.64–87; Bachmann, ‘Trust, power and control’. 
29 Michel, ‘Time to get emotional’. 
30 Kydd, Trust and Mistrust; Kydd, ‘Trust, reassurance, and cooperation’, International Organization, 54:2 
(2002), pp.325-57. 
31 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma. 
32 Hoffman, ‘A conceptualization of trust’ p.381.  
33 See Bernd Lahno, ‘On the emotional character of trust’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 4:2 (2001), 
pp.171–89; Nicholas Wheeler, Trusting Enemies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Jonathan Mercer, 
‘Rationality and psychology in international relations’, International Organization, 59:1 (2005), pp.77–106; 
Michel, ‘Trust, rationality and vulnerability’; Eric Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
34 Nicholas Rengger ‘The ethics of trust in world politics’, International Affairs, 73:3 (1997), p.472. Rengger 
develops this definition from Annette Baier. Rengger uses ‘discretionary power’, which we amend here to avoid 
confusion with our uses of power. 
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habitual practices in which processes of long-term cooperation are embedded in world 
politics’ in which players do not always consciously decide to trust.35 Understanding trust as a 
practice that can exist alongside other practices does not place trust and power in opposition 
to each other but allows them to be at work in the same contexts. It also avoids assuming a 
certain type of formally independent international trusting actor, unlike definitions that rely 
on accepting/ignoring vulnerability. 
Our second element is trust as identification, which builds on Hoffman’s work on 
‘fiduciary’ trust that points out how discretion alone is not enough for trust, because exercise 
of discretion could simply be a calculative act of risk taking.36 Trust also needs to include a 
‘relational and affective element’37 outlined by moral/emotional accounts of trust, so that it 
‘involves risk, but cannot be reduced to risk’.38 This relational element is evident in trust as 
identification, or a trust that is founded on an emotional identification with other members of 
a perceived in-group.39 When individuals share values, experiences, and common goals, they 
view one another as familiar and create ties of reciprocity.40 Shared identities lead to the 
construction of common expectations about obligations and similar views on grievances,41 all 
of which provide the grounding for trust. In our conceptualisation of trust, the granting of 
discretion is accompanied by ‘shared values, perceived similarities, sympathy and a common 
vision’.42 Such trust is not merely rooted in rational trust linked to calculation, but it also 
identifies one’s needs and self with the other. We term this two-sided view of trust as ‘trust as 
belonging’. 
Our claim is that trust as belonging, understood as the exercise of discretion 
accompanied by the expression of shared identities, can be understood as a practice that is 
embedded in the relationships under study alongside complex relations of power. This 
provides a long-term view of trust developed as the ‘product of particular identity 
relationships that develop over time’.43 Actors identify commonalities, engage at the inter-
personal level (such as through face-to-face meetings), and empathetically ‘put oneself into 
 
35 Ibid., p.472; Michel, ‘Trust, rationality and vulnerability’, p.93. 
36 Hoffman, ‘A Conceptualization of Trust’. 
37 Clara Weinhardt, ‘Relational trust in international cooperation’, Journal of Trust Research, 5:1 (2015), p.32. 
38 Hoffman, ‘A Conceptualization of Trust’, p.384. 
39 Mercer, ‘Rationality and psychology; Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust; J. David Lewis and Andrew 
Weigert, ‘Trust as a social reality’, Social Forces, 63 (1985), pp.967–85.  
40 Robert F. Hurley, Decision to Trust (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2011), p.57. 
41 Dorothea Hillhorst, The Real World of NGOs (London: ZED, 2003), p.31. 
42 Weinhardt, ‘Relational trust’, p.32. 
43 Ibid., p.34. 
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the other fellow’s place’.44 Donors and local actors may share core values and goals (such as 
the provision of healthcare services) or identities (such as religious convictions), despite the 
diversity of power they possess. In addition, they may share common norms and values about 
the ways the world should work and their role in achieving that vision, with such norms and 
values promoted by donors and international NGOs. Trust as belonging is part of the ongoing 
practices and habits embedded into relationships and interacts with the forms of power that 
are also at play. 
Developing an account of trust in IR that engages with dependency and multiple 
forms of power allows us to examine how actors have different and shifting types of 
uncertainty and vulnerability and how these are ameliorated or compounded by the power 
relations in which actors are embedded. It enables us to question how trust as belonging 
informs, trumps, or is superseded by forms of power. As Rengger asserts, ‘The exercise of 
trust can alter power positions’ so the ‘exercise of trust’ in contexts of large power 
imbalances and situations of dependency is important in global politics.45  
 
FORMS OF POWER IN DONOR-LOCAL RELATIONS IN HEALTH 
 
The exercise of power is central to health systems and health diplomacy; it shapes resource 
distribution, policies and practices, issue prioritization, possibilities for transformation, and 
ultimately, health outcomes.46 Health system performance results from the interplay between 
‘hardware’ (finance, technologies, and human resources) and ‘software’ (ideas, interests, 
values, power, and norms),47 and power relations and social processes shape these 
interactions at the local, national, and global levels.48 Using Moon’s 2019 taxonomy of power 
in global health, this section introduces the forms of power at play in the donor-FBO 
 
44 Nicholas Wheeler, ‘To put oneself into the other fellow’s place’, International Relations, 22:1 (2008), pp.493-
509; also Wheeler, Trusting Enemies. 
45 Rengger, ‘The ethics of trust’, p.481. 
46 Sriram et al. ‘10 best resources on power’, p.612; David McCoy and Guddi Singh, ‘A spanner in the works? 
Anti-politics in global health policy’, International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 3:3 (2015), 
pp.151-53.  
47 Kabir Sheikh, Lucy Gilson, Irene Akua Agyepong, Kara Hanson, Freddie Ssengooba, and Sara Bennett. 
‘Building the field of health policy and systems research’, PLoS Med 8:8 (2011), e1001073. 
48 Pfeiffer, ‘International NGOs and primary health care’, p.735; Craig Janes, and Kitty Corbett, ‘Anthropology 
and global health’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 38 (2009), pp.167-83; Katerini Storeng, and Arima Mishra, 
‘Politics and practices of global health’, Global Public Health, 9:8 (2014), pp.858-64; James Pfeiffer and Mimi 
Nichter, ‘What can critical medical anthropology contribute to global health?’, Medical Anthropology 
Quarterly, 22:4 (2008), pp.410-15. 
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relationships we examine. These forms of power ‘can mutually reinforce tremendous power 
disparities in global health’, but power is neither immutable nor divorced from trust.49 
The most visible form of power in donor-local relations is compulsory power, which 
enables donors to compel local actors to act.50 This power specifically derives from the 
economic power that donors have through the development assistance for  
Health (DAH) they provide.51 However, this is not straightforward domination. Even where 
local actors such as the FBOs examined here depend significantly on donors for financial 
support, dependency is a two-way street whereby donors also rely on local actors to deliver 
health outcomes.52 Locals may enact compliance to gain material resources,53 performing 
identification with economically powerful partners. We recognise that at times, compulsory 
power (and resulting performances of compliance) may be entangled with trust as 
identification in an indecipherable knot.54  
A more ‘insidious’ form of power that shapes the extent of donor influence in health 
diplomacy is structural power (the power to ‘structure subjects’ capacities’).55 Both structural 
and productive power (see below) are in no one’s hands – instead the global economy works 
to the advantage of structurally empowered actors (donors) and to the disadvantage of the 
weaker, local actors. Actors do not necessarily recognise domination and can act in ways that 
reproduce it.56 Donors harness structural power through their positions in institutions (i.e. 
institutional power), whereby they exert indirect control over local actors from a distance 
through formal or informal rules.57 At the global level, for example, donors dominate the 
World Bank where votes are proportional to a member-state’s budgetary contributions.58 At 
the national level, they use health policy processes and structures and embed their external 
technical advisors within government health ministries.59 In these ways, they not only 
exercise economic power but also perpetuate a productive power rooted in ideas, beliefs, and 
 
49 Moon, ‘Power in global governance’, p.8. 
50 Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in international politics’. 
51 See Rita Jalali, ‘Financing empowerment?’, Sociology Compass, 7:1 (2013), pp.55-73. 
52 Stephen Ellis, Season of Rains (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), pp.6,33. 
53 James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p.9. 
54 Ibid.; Anderson and Patterson, Dependent Agency.  
55 Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in international politics’, p.43.  
56 Stephen Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974), p.24; Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in 
international politics’, p.55-6. 
57 Moon, ‘Power in global governance’, p.6; Kent Buse and Sarah Hawkes, ‘Health post 2015’, Lancet, 383 
(2014), pp.678-9. 
58 Moon, ‘Power in global governance’, p.6. 
59 Emma-Louise Anderson, ‘African health diplomacy’, International Relations, 32:2 (2018), pp.194–217; 




discourses.60 Yet even within such structural constraints, scholars illustrate how informal 
networks, common ways of perceiving, and shared identities may enable manoeuvring and 
discretion, giving those with limited structural or economic power a voice.61 
Productive power relies on ‘systems of knowledge and discursive practices to provide 
the meanings, norms, values and identities that not only constrain actors, but also constitute 
them’.62 Thus, productive power may provide opportunities for incorporation and inclusion.63  
There are three forms of unseen and unrecognised productive power that are particularly 
suited for entanglement with trust as identification, because they rely on shared meanings, 
norms, values and identities to function.64 The first is discursive power, which contributes to 
shared practices and worldviews. Discursive power operates through neoliberalism in the 
sense that it is a deeply embedded, hegemonic idea – a ‘deep core’ – that conditions debates, 
shrinks ‘policy space’, and ‘colonize[s]’ global health paradigms.65 Neoliberalism refers to 
the emergence of new ‘arts of government’ developed in the global north - notably a 
‘technical reliance on market mechanisms, valorization of “private enterprise” and a 
suspicion of the state’.66 This neoliberal discursive power limits the realm of activities to 
those focused on technical efficiency, financial accountability, results, and market-driven 
solutions. Dominant modes of operation (‘communities of practice’) emerge, become 
entrenched, and are unquestioningly replicated67 through report writing, development jargon, 
and ‘best practices’ across multiple contexts.68 Although it appears that donors wield 
discursive power over locals in that they ‘shape the language others use to conceptualize, 
frame, and thereby define and understand’ in accordance with neoliberalism,69 the picture is 
more complicated. Neoliberalism can take on new life in African contexts:70 local actors can 
perform compliance with these practices (even though it may seem that they just ‘mindlessly 
 
60 Martin Carstensen and Vivien Schmidt, ‘Power through, over and in ideas’, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 23:3 (2016), pp.318-37, pp.320-1.  
61 Eduard Grebe, ‘The Treatment Action Campaign's struggle for AIDS treatment in South Africa’, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 37:4 (2011), pp.849-68. 
62 Rita Abrahamsen, ‘The power of partnerships in global governance’, Third World Quarterly, 25:8 (2004), 
pp.1453-67, p.1459. 
63 Ibid, p.1462. 
64 Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in international politics’, p.55. 
65 Simon Rushton and Owain Williams, ‘Frames, paradigms and power’, Global Society, 26:2 (2012), pp.147-
67; Lisa Forman, ‘The ghost is the machine’ International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 5:3 
(2015), pp.197-9. 
66 James Ferguson, ‘The uses of neoliberalism’, Antipode 41 (2010), pp.166-84, p.173. 
67 Séverine Autesserre, Peaceland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
68 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Andrea 
Cornwall and Karen Brock, ‘What do buzzwords do for development policy?’ Third World Quarterly, 26:7 
(2005), pp.1043-60. 
69 Moon, ‘Power in global governance’, p.6. 
70 Ferguson, ‘The uses of neoliberalism’, p.173. 
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enact received scripts’)71 and leverage discourses,72 all the while laying the foundation for 
trust as identification.  
For FBOs, religious worldview forms an additional layer of discourse alongside 
neoliberalism. As Bornstein illustrates, religious belief is a powerful undertone, one that 
‘inform[s] the ways that development projects are received, interpreted and accepted in 
specific societal and historical contexts…  and the way that development is planned, 
conceptualized, motivated and instituted’.73 FBOs often emphasise service provision as a 
means to ‘witness their faith, fulfil religious teachings… or “do good” for others in the 
community’, although the ways that their religious beliefs intersect with secularism vary 
significantly with the organization and its staff.74 Part of the religious discourse revolves 
around the ways that ‘spiritual belief offers access to an alternative form of power’.75 
Second, epistemic power comes from ‘shaping what others consider to be legitimate 
knowledge’ and claims of expertise,76 with a network of experts sharing common values, 
epistemologies, methodologies, and practices.77 However, global health’s interdisciplinary 
and multidisciplinary nature, lack of common epistemology, and colonisation by non-health 
experts like economists may undermine this power.78 Counter-epistemic communities may 
challenge biomedical ‘expertise’, as occurred in South Africa around AIDS and antiretroviral 
medications, with a counter epistemic power influencing policies that delayed treatment 
rollout and ultimately, cost lives.79 Additionally, because the boundaries of relevant 
knowledge in global health are porous, actors may have epistemic power because of 
localised, contextual knowledge.  
 
71 John Meyer, John Boli, George Thomas and Francisco Ramirez, ‘World society and the nation-state’, 
American Journal of Sociology, 103:1 (1997), pp.144-81.  
72 Anderson, ‘Shadow diplomacy’; Anderson and Patterson, Dependent Agency; Jeremy Shiffman, ‘Agency, 
structure and the power of global health networks’, International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 7: 
10 (2018), pp.79-84; Scott, Weapons of the Weak.  
73 Erica Bornstein, The Spirit of Development: (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), p.2. 
74 Ram Canaan, The Newer Deal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p.300. 
75 Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar, ‘Religion and politics in sub-Saharan Africa’, Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 36:2 (1998), pp.175-201, p.195. 
76 Moon, ‘Power in global governance’, p.6; Shiffman, ‘Knowledge, moral claims and the exercise of power’; 
Kelley Lee, ‘Revealing power in truth’, International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 4:4 (2015), 
pp.257–9. 
77 Peter Haas, ‘Epistemic communities and international policy coordination’, International Organization, 46:1 
(1992), pp.1-36. 
78 Karen Grépin, ‘Power and priorities’, International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 4:5 (2015), 
pp.321-22; Rushton, ‘The politics of researching global health politics’, International Health Policy and 
Management, 4:5 (2015), pp. 311-14. 
79 Jeremy Youde, AIDS, South Africa, and the Politics of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2016). 
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Third, normative power is ‘when an actor shapes the principles that others believe to 
be right or wrong, and the actions that may then follow’.80 It emerges from standing for 
ethical principles, claiming to serve as a community ‘conscience’, and at times, challenging 
other powers that distort justice, equity and access. As the power of what ‘ought to be’, 
normative power may be rooted in religious or ethical beliefs or in the participation of those it 
affects.81 In Africa, where many people claim high levels of religiosity, FBOs may embody 
this power.82 Unlike discursive power (which is systemic), normative power involves direct 
claims making based on principles (‘naming and shaming’), with such claims-making being a 
tool to achieve policy outcomes.83 Christian FBOs, for example, may point to Christ’s 
admonition to ‘do for the least of these’ when asserting the ‘rightness’ of their position. 
Because Christ’s words are foundational to the faith, they evoke shared understandings that 
can promote trust as identification.   
Finally, existing work on global health governance recognises trust as a foundation 
for one aspect of power – network power – which ‘is wielded when individuals use their 
personal relationships with others to shape their thinking and/or action. Such relationships 
may be built on trust, reciprocity, repeated interactions over many years, shared experiences, 
shared identities, or other factors’.84 Network power can translate into other forms of power 




We employ a two-level definition of trust. At its most basic, trust focuses on discretionary 
actions, meaning that donors’ trust of locals could include giving funds to those partners and 
putting them in control of their projects, ultimately placing both their material interests and 
their reputation into the partners’ hands. In turn, locals’ trust of donors is apparent when 
locals play by donors’ rules, giving donors discretion over outcomes. Yet, because we view 
trust to include identification, we also operationalize trust as evidenced in shared expressions 
of meanings, worldviews, values and empathy expressed for the other.   
 
80 Moon, ‘Power in global governance’, p.6. 
81 Rushton, ‘The politics of researching’. 
82 Patterson, Church and AIDS in Africa; Jeffrey Haynes, Religion and Development (Basingstoke: Springer, 
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83 Shiffman, ‘Knowledge, moral claims and the exercise of power’. 
84 Moon, ‘Power in global governance’, p.6.  
85 Ibid., pp.6-7; Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The forms of capital’, Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg, (eds.) The 
Sociology of Economic Life (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018); Johanna Hanefeld and Gill Walt, ‘Knowledge and 
networks’, International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 4:2 (2015), pp.119-21. 
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 We utilize a comparative case study of the Christian Health Association of Malawi 
(CHAM) and the Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ), two FBOs that provide 
health care services in Malawi and Zambia, respectively. Formed in 1964, CHAM is a 
network of 175 health institutions (e.g. clinics and hospitals) that the Catholic Church and 11 
Protestant denominations operate. CHAZ, established in 1970, includes 157 health 
institutions run by the Catholic Church and 15 Protestant denominations. Both FBOs have 
professional secretariats to manage relations with member churches and donors and mobilise 
donor funding, and both employ nationals as public health experts in their secretariats and 
member health institutions.86  
CHAZ and CHAM cannot be divorced from their country contexts. As southern 
African countries, Zambia and Malawi share many historical, cultural, and political 
experiences (e.g. high poverty rates; British colonial history; Christian majority populations). 
In both countries, donors operate within a neoliberal transnational aid context and rely on 
biomedical expertise.87 Holding these factors constant, we can point to variations that may 
affect the power and trust that donors and FBOs exercise. First, the countries have different 
levels of DAH dependency, potentially giving donors more economic power in health in 
Malawi than Zambia. In 2016, DAH accounted for 72 percent of all health expenditures in 
Malawi (US$443 million)88, but 34 percent in Zambia.89 Second, each country presents 
different possibilities for the FBOs’ institutional power. Both FBOs are not autonomous from 
government, which is responsible for most of their operational costs (90 percent for CHAM 
and 75 percent for CHAZ).90 Both FBOs have representation on multiple government 
institutions (see below), but unlike CHAM, CHAZ has been a principal recipient of multi-
million dollar Global Fund grants since the program began in 2002.  
  Our ground-up approach with respondents in Lilongwe in July 2014 and Lusaka in 
2007, 2011, and 2014 allowed respondents to shape the research agenda around questions of 
 
86 CHAZ, ‘About us’ (2018), available at: {http://www.chaz.org.zm/about-chaz}; CHAM, ‘Our impact’ (2017), 
available at: {http://www.cham.org.mw/our-impact.html}. 
87 Susan Watkins and Ann Swidler, ‘Working misunderstandings’, Population and Development Review, 
38:Suppl. (2013), pp.197-208, p.199. 
88 Government of Malawi, ‘Health sector resource mapping FY2017/18-2019/20 (2020), available at: 
{http://www.health.gov.mw/index.php/reports?download=54:resource-mapping-round-5}, p.15. 
89 Health Policy Project, ‘Health financing profile: Zambia’, (May 2016), available at: 
{https://www.healthpolicyproject.com/pubs/7887/Zambia_HFP.pdf}. 
90 CHAM, ‘Annual report’ (2015), available at: 
{http://www.cham.org.mw/uploads/7/3/0/8/73088105/annual_report_final_2015_opt.pdf}, p.48; Christopher 
Simoonga and Karen Sichinga, ‘Zambian case study: Key lessons on PPP between CHAZ and MoH’. 
Presentation in Washington, DC (7-9 July 2015), available at: {https://slideplayer.com/slide/11775667}. 
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power and trust.91 We conducted semi-structured interviews with key actors: (1) country-
level programme officers working with the major international donors in the health sector 
(e.g. UK Department for International Development-DfID and US Agency for International 
Development-USAID); (2) technical advisors working with the Ministries of Health who 
have discretion over health resources; (3) officials in the Ministries of Health; (4) 
representatives of FBOs that provide significant health services (CHAM and CHAZ 
representatives, as well as officials at ecumenical church organisations like the Christian 
Council of Zambia); (5) major international NGOs that operate health programmes; and (6) 
international consultants who work with donors. We conducted 24 interviews in Malawi and 
42 in Zambia. In addition, we rely on informal discussions with key actors, and informal 
observations at trainings or meetings we attended. Finally, we conducted documentary 
analysis of agreements, reports, presentations and media stories.  
We sought to establish trust between the researcher and participants in various ways. 
We relied on snowball sampling based on personal recommendations to gain access to 
officials. Because the research spanned over multiple years, authors had previously met and 
even interviewed several informants. In addition, one author’s knowledge of the Chichewa 
language, and another’s deep ties to Anglican, Presbyterian, and Reformed Church 
institutions facilitated access to and rapport with local actors. A shared status as an outsider 
helped to establish rapport with donor and NGO officials. We recognise how at times we too 
relied on trust as identification.92 We structured interviews around broad themes, such as the 
actors’ roles, perceptions of key health challenges, efforts to address these challenges, 
expectations of other actors, and expectations they face. This sequencing allowed the 
interviewees to determine the conversation’s direction, as questions moved from issues that 
respondents were more comfortable discussing to those that were more sensitive.93 We 
recorded most interviews (with permission) and assured respondents of the confidentiality of 
responses and their anonymity in publications.94  
 
 
TRUST AS BELONGING IN FBO-DONOR RELATIONS  
 
91 See Anne Mills, ‘Health policy and systems research’, Health Policy and Planning, 27:1 (2011), pp.1-7, p.6. 
92 Friederike Welter and Alex Nadezhda, ‘Researching trust in different cultures’, in Fergus Lyon, Guido 
Möllering, and Mark Saunders (eds), Handbook of Research Methods on Trust (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2015), pp.75-85, p.81.  
93 Mark Saunders, ‘Using mixed methods' in Lyon, Ibid, pp.134-44, p.135. 




This section examines the nuances of how trust as belonging -  or the complex duality of trust 
as discretion and identification –interacts with various forms of power in the relations 
between FBOs and donors in Malawi and Zambia. We begin by examining how trust is 
exercised where donors give the FBOs discretion over two things they fundamentally care 
about: their resources and projects. We find that power and trust interact in a dynamic cycle 
that can be virtuous or vicious. We then explore the role of trust as common identification 
through shared neoliberal and faith-based values, examining how FBOs identify with 
communities and donors as knowledge brokers, and the crucial role of networks. We expose 
how identification underpins the power-trust cycle. Finally, we draw conclusions about the 
potential for the power-trust cycle to be transformed.  
 
Discretion over resources 
Resources are key to trust as the exercise of discretion in contexts where donors have 
considerable economic power and FBOs, significant dependency. Donors provide DAH to 
Malawi and Zambia and have power over whether to give or withhold (conditional) aid. The 
resulting volatility undermines local capacity and may mean local actors agree to what donors 
want, fearing that if they do not, donors will cut recipients’ funding when aid budgets shrink. 
And yet, despite these asymmetrical power relations, trust is often present in donor-local 
relations.  
In Zambia, donors exhibit trust by giving CHAZ discretion over significant (and 
increasing) amounts of funding.95 CHAZ received its first grant from Danish Church Aid in 
1992, and by 2004, it was a Global Fund principal recipient.96 In 2012, the US government 
authorised CHAZ to receive funds directly as the lead agency for the PEPFAR-funded 
AIDSRelief project.97 Between 2011 and 2018, donor income grew from USD 25.79 million 
to USD 33.3 million, and the organisation had maintained other income sources and annual 
 
95 In 2011, 81 percent of CHAZ’s annual income came from donors and in 2018, 90 percent. CHAZ, ‘2018 
annual report’, (2018), available at: {https://www.chaz.org.zm/download/annual-report-
2018/?wpdmdl=1870&refresh=5d74f70d32a4b1567946509}, p.36; CHAZ, ‘2011 annual report’, (2011), 
available at: {https://www.chaz.org.zm/download/annual-report-
2011/?wpdmdl=822&refresh=5f0ce8d7e8fe41594681559}, p.6. 
96 ‘A discussion with Karen Sichinga, Executive Director of Churches Health Association of Zambia’, Interview 
published online, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World affairs, Georgetown University, Washington, 
DC (14 February 2014), available at: {https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion-with-karen-
sichinga-executive-director-churches-health-association-of-zambia}. 
97 CRS and AIDSRelief, ‘The AIDSRelief Zambia partnership: Transitioning to the Churches Health 




surpluses. Its list of donors has expanded,98 and there has been some flexibility in donor aid.99 
Most notably, as of 2019, CHAZ had received USD 365 million from the Global Fund, just 
behind UNDP (USD 385 million) and the Ministry of Health-Zambia (MoH-Z) (USD 420 
million).100 CHAZ’s relations with multiple donor partners limited the economic power of a 
single donor, though its secretariat did recognise overall dependency as a problem.101  
In Malawi, local actors are acutely dependent and lack economic power.102 Discretion 
in this case may be partial, superficial and precarious, such that for donors a calculation of the 
risks of defection is still prominent. CHAM has faced major resource challenges because 
reports of financial mismanagement in 2010 eroded donor confidence. One key secretariat 
official with responsibility for the budget reflected on how this had become a ‘vicious circle’: 
‘Where we had no funding we could not attract competent people. When the donors came to 
the secretariat they did not find anyone who was competent and they think CHAM is not 
worth it [funding]’.103 Where CHAM had limited economic power it had to be more 
responsive to donor requirements to improve its reputation and attract funding.104  
CHAM’s lack of economic power leads it to use extraversion: the process of 
strategically turning one’s poverty and powerlessness into assets to gain resources and 
status.105 Extraversion is a strategy that both requires a level of trust and is a request for trust. 
The CHAM secretariat has stressed the hopelessness of CHAM’s situation, particularly in 
light of past financial mismanagement and poor donor relations: ‘There are so many issues 
that are legacies of that mismanagement that are coming in the way of our partnership. I do 
not know if I can see through them’.106 Like the dependency found in patron-client relations, 
CHAM expresses its vulnerability with the ‘leap of faith’107 that economically powerful 
 
98 CHAZ, ‘2018 annual report’, p.36; CHAZ, ‘2011 annual report’, p.6; CHAZ, ‘2013 annual report’, (2013), 
available at: {https://www.chaz.org.zm/download/annual-report-
2013/?wpdmdl=825&refresh=5f0cea676ab8d1594681959}, p.35. 
99 CHAZ, ‘2018 annual report’, p.11. 
100 Global Fund, ‘Partner investments’, Dataset (2019), available at: 
{https://data.theglobalfund.org/partners/ZMB}. 
101 CHAZ, ‘Strategic plan 2017-2021’, (2017), available at: {https://www.chaz.org.zm/download/chaz-strategic-
plan-2017-2021/?wpdmdl=805&refresh=5f0ca20d4fb531594663437}. 
102 In 2015, 97 percent of CHAM’s operating budget came from donors. CHAM, ‘Annual report’, (2015), p.547. 
103 Interview, CHAM representative, Lilongwe (03 July 2014). 
104 CHAM, ‘Strategic plan 2015-2019’, (2015), available at: 
{http://www.cham.org.mw/uploads/7/3/0/8/73088105/cham_strategic_plan_7-2-15__1___1_.pdf}, p.6; 
Interview, CHAM representative, Lilongwe (03 July 2014). 
105 Jean-François Bayart (Trans. Stephen Ellis), ‘Africa in the world’, African Affairs, 99:395 (2000), pp.217-67. 
106 Interview, CHAM Representative, Lilongwe (03 July 2014). 
107 Guido Möllering, Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity (Oxford: Elsevier, 2006). 
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donors would benevolently provide resources, exemplifying how the ‘exercise of trust’108 can 
change power relations.109  
Economic power and discretion can interact as part of a virtuous power-trust cycle, as 
CHAZ demonstrates. As CHAZ is entrusted with greater funding, its economic power 
increases, which empowers it to lobby for both increases in future funding and greater 
discretion over how such resources can be used. On the other hand, as CHAM shows, a lack 
of trust can limit economic power and diminish capacity, which further erodes trust as 
discretion in a vicious power-trust cycle. While power-trust cycles can be mutually 
reinforcing, they are neither static nor immutable, but are subject to continuous contestation 
and renegotiation. 
 
Discretion over projects 
Trust is also present where donors give local actors discretion over the projects rolled out in 
their name. FBOs have considerable institutional and epistemic power that donors rely on in 
the realm of health. The institutional power of both FBOs is rooted in the hundreds of local 
churches that support them across both countries, giving them extensive reach into remote 
areas hard to resource and staff. A CHAM secretariat official with responsibilities for 
managing relations with members reflected that ‘at the local level we are appreciated, 
particularly in remote areas’ because CHAM is ‘all they have known all their lives’.110 
Similarly, local partners say they trust CHAZ to look out for their interests, repeating 
statements like: ‘They help us. They assure our voice is heard. They are our friends’.111  
The FBOs’ institutional power intertwines with epistemic power derived from 
expertise in health care delivery. They are organisations led by medical doctors and 
individuals with lengthy public health experience and both have particular expertise in 
delivering health care in hard-to-reach rural communities.112 CHAM institutions provide 37 
percent of Malawi’s health services and 75 percent of services in rural areas. CHAZ affiliates 
provide 40 percent of Zambia’s health care and 50 percent in rural areas. In addition, their 
presence in underserved areas has been long-standing, with many health centres existing from 
before independence and some for over 100 years. FBO health workers live in the local 
 
108 Rengger, ‘Ethics of trust’, p.481. 
109 James Ferguson, Global Shadows (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010). 
110 Interview, CHAM representative, Lilongwe (03 July 2014). 
111 Interviews, Expanded Church Response official, Lusaka (17 August 2007); Christian Council of Zambia 
official, Lusaka (25 February 2011). 
112 Patterson, Church and AIDS in Africa. 
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communities in areas where it is hard to entice health workers to stay, with CHAM’s 
workers, for example, being bonded to four to five years of service after their training. Thus, 
they are uniquely positioned to understand local needs. A CHAM representative described 
them as ‘partners with the people’.113 They have informal relations with local power brokers 
such as traditional leaders.. Reflecting a common theme in all the Zambian interviews, one 
CHAZ official explained that long-standing community relations enabled CHAZ to 
understand the types of health interventions that local populations would, or would not, 
accept.114  
Both FBOs extend their epistemic power by sharing their expertise. At the national 
level, they run health training programmes that contribute significantly to much-needed 
capacity development.115 CHAM’s 12 training colleges provided the ‘backbone’ of training 
for up to 80 percent of mid-level health professionals in Malawi in 2014. With student intake 
doubling in 10 years, CHAM’s epistemic influence is growing.116 This track record brings 
some economic power because it attracts donor support, including for scholarships.117 CHAZ 
operates 11 similar training schools and conducts trainings in auditing and management for 
church-health institutions.118 The donors IMA World Health and USAID have showcased the 
efforts of both FBOs through the Africa Christian Health Associations Platform (ACHAP).119 
CHAZ also has shared its management expertise with other African FBOs. CHAZ’s ability to 
teach ‘best practices’ through ‘south-south learning’ deepens its epistemic power120, which in 
turn advances its institutional power.  
 This institutional and epistemic power provides the foundations for  trust in terms of 
the discretion for both CHAM and CHAZ over delivering  health care, which then 
strengthens their institutional power through their partnerships in national institutions in a 
virtuous cycle. Both FBOs are the major partners to the government and this facilitates 
 
113 Interview, CHAM representative, Lilongwe (03 July 2014). 
114 Interview, CHAZ official, Lusaka (16 August 2007). 
115 Government of Malawi, ‘Health sector strategic plan (2011-2016)’, available at: 
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resource pooling, service delivery, and specialization along task or geographic lines.121 Both 
are represented on national AIDS councils, Global Fund required Country Coordinating 
Mechanisms, and Ministry of Health technical working groups, yet the two differ somewhat 
in the depth of institutional power and the levels of trust. 
  In Zambia, informants say that even when CHAZ has had differences with the 
government (e.g. about government reimbursements), they work to preserve a ‘cooperative’, 
‘positive’, ‘collaborative’, and ‘trusted partnership’.122 CHAZ often plays along when 
government claims credit for its accomplishments. As one donor official said, reflecting a 
widespread donor sentiment in Zambia, ‘Sometimes government is really proud of CHAZ 
and says it [CHAZ] is actually government’.123 The relationship has enabled CHAZ to 
convince the MoH-Z to act on issues such as hospice care, the creation of health databases in 
new districts, and autonomy for church-run facilities.124 The relationship may be aided by the 
larger political context, in which the national ecumenical church bodies that support CHAZ 
have played only a limited role in politics in the last decade.125 The positive CHAZ-
government relationship also makes it easier for donors to work with CHAZ, because they 
can claim to respect state sovereignty and eschew political entanglements. Hence, CHAZ has 
been involved with the World Bank’s Performance-Based Financing group, the Country 
Coordinating Mechanism grant formulation and disbursement meetings, and stakeholder 
sessions to write the National Health Strategic Framework and the National AIDS Strategic 
Framework.126 CHAZ’s institutional power enables it to benefit from discursive power as it 
reifies the neoliberal idea that service delivery is a technical, apolitical exercise.127  
CHAM also has institutional power through its relationship with the government, with 
a key representative of the CHAM secretariat who worked closely with the government 
explaining that ‘government points the direction and we come in to support the government 
to steer the ship in that direction’.128 However, disputes between CHAM and government due 
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to mismanagement of donor funding and the breakdown in local service level agreements 
have had the potential to limit CHAM’s institutional power and make it harder for the donors 
to work with CHAM. Both the government and CHAM claimed the other had reneged on 
obligations in the service level agreement whereby CHAM provides services and the 
government reimburses those services by paying CHAM salaries.129 This affected the 
operation of facilities, led to diminishing worker morale and exacerbated ‘brain drain’ of 
workers from CHAM facilities to government facilities. In response, some CHAM facilities 
refused to provide services and others reintroduced user fees - both actions diminished 
community trust for those facilities and eroded CHAM’s institutional ties to member 
churches.130 A key independent negotiator in the dispute reported that ‘meaningful dialogue’ 
had broken down, primarily because of the ‘trust gap’ between the Ministry of Health-
Malawi (MoH-M) and CHAM.131 These tensions are set within a context in which Malawian 
churches have become more engaged in civil society mobilization on good governance 
issues.132 In the wake of this dispute a CHAM secretariat official highlighted the importance 
of strengthening trust, working with donors and government so that they understand CHAM’s 
role, interests and needs, particularly its fundamental need ‘to be valued and seen as 
relevant’. The secretariat’s strategy included face-to-face interactions through participating in 
technical working groups where ‘[we should] express [our]selves without being self-
serving’.133   
Long-term relationships, institutional partnerships and practices of knowledge transfer 
are foundations of trust as discretion, as donors depend on the FBOs to deliver project 
outcomes, something possible because of their experience and knowledge of local contexts. 
This dependence also deepens the FBOs’ epistemic power and can position them as brokers 
between donors and local communities (explored below) in a virtuous cycle. However, the 
power-trust cycle can become vicious and we highlight the importance of understanding these 
complex dynamics. We now move on to consider the important role of common identification 
that operates alongside trust as discretion. 
 
Neoliberal and faith-based identification 
 
129 Interview, Independent consultant on health and development, Lilongwe (29 June 2014). 
130 Interview, Independent consultant on health and development, Lilongwe (29 June 2014). See Chimwemwe 
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The sharing of ethical values and practices between donors and FBOs is key to trust as 
identification. Both FBOs relied on sharing common identities and commitments with donor 
audiences to promote trust, harnessing the discursive power of neoliberalism and drawing on 
shared faith-based identities. They differ in these efforts because of their organisations’ 
histories: CHAM engaged in performances to build trust while CHAZ reaffirmed trust.  
CHAM has emphasised its commitment to transparency by publicly acknowledging a 
legacy of mismanagement and contrasting past and current organisational practices. 
Reflecting the position set out in the ‘Strategic Plan 2015-2019’, one secretariat member 
explained how ‘five years ago the secretariat had huge management issues, so we lost a lot of 
partnerships with financial mismanagement. International Christian and government donors 
were pulling out. That legacy led to a weakened position’.134 To address this weakness, 
CHAM had to be responsive to donor requirements to improve its reputation and relied on 
DfID (through the consultancy organization Options) for technical support in financial 
management and governance.135 CHAM instituted reforms, repaid debts, ‘initiated a thorough 
organisational overhaul’, and terminated responsible parties.136 Its strategic plan emphasised 
a commitment to reposition itself as a ‘modern, sustainable and efficient association’ with a 
focus on ‘management’.137 In short, it adopted the practices and language that undergird 
donors’ discursive power in order to be attractive to a variety of donors.138  
CHAZ has engaged in activities that remind partners that it already is a trusted 
partner. It has heralded its history of transparency, made its external audits public, disclosed 
tenders for procurement of medical supplies, and held annual meetings with CHAZ members 
to gain their input on policy proposals. CHAZ had internalized the activities and jargon of 
neoliberalism, including a focus on ‘remaining competitive’, even framing its new office 
location as an efficient way to avoid the ‘unbearable’ downtown Lusaka traffic.139 CHAZ’s 
normative power rooted in a history of ethical behaviours deepens donors’ trust. CHAZ 
emphasizes this history: 
CHAZ has had 15 years [of] unbroken record of accomplishment as a PR [principal 
recipient] of the Global Fund mostly attributed to its strong governance structures and 
adherence to its principles of transparency and accountability…. During the 2009 
 
134 Ibid.; CHAM, ‘Strategic plan 2015-2019’, p.6. 
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Global Fund OIG [Office of Inspector General] audits, CHAZ was the only PR to 
have passed a clean bill of health.140  
 
Both CHAM and CHAZ contrasted themselves with government ministries and other NGOs 
that were perceived to be corrupt, incompetent, and unable to do their jobs (such as paying 
health-workers’ salaries).141 In the wake of ‘Cashgate’ in Malawi in 2013, when news broke 
that government officials absconded with an estimated USD 150 million, CHAM had the 
opportunity to make such contrasts. There was a ‘crisis of confidence’ amongst donors who 
then withheld USD 150 million142 and embedded technical advisors into the MoH-M in order 
to have ‘eyes on the ground’ to help audit DAH expenditures and to bolster technical 
capacity.143 Even if donors did not fully trust CHAM, it became the least distrusted partner, 
as donors bypassed government and funded NGOs.144 Similarly, ‘CHAZ looked good’ in 
2010 when another Global Fund principal recipient—the Zambia National AIDS Network 
(ZNAN) —was reported to have stolen significant Global Fund monies. Donors then trusted 
CHAZ to take over management of ZNAN’s grants.145 Because the scandal related to 
channeling ZNAN funds to government officials,146 CHAZ appeared to be a technical 
organisation above the dirtiness of politics, one aligned with neoliberal discourses on service 
delivery and religious discourses on honesty and integrity.  
While the two organisations differed in how they portrayed themselves in light of 
their past experiences, both drew on religious discourses to promote shared values and 
identity with donors and local populations. For CHAZ, this meant emphasizing its family-
centred approach to health care, as the executive director wrote: ‘I have no doubt that the 
CHAZ model of delivering healthcare services that places the family at the 
centre…contributed to CHAZ’s outstanding performance over the years’.147 The Catholic 
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concept of subsidiarity that focuses on tackling underdevelopment at the lowest level 
undergirds CHAZ’s activities, as well as the cultural focus on the individual as part of a 
family unit.148 This faith-based perspective aligned CHAZ with several international FBOs, 
such as World Vision, Ecumenical Pharmaceutical Network, Catholic Relief Services, and 
Christian Aid. Together, locals and donors shared a biblical language and spiritual motivation 
for engagement on health, believing that people are created in God’s image and that God calls 
Christians to build ‘heaven on earth’ by meeting people’s basic needs.149 Not only does the 
family-based approach show CHAZ’s identification with faith-based donors, but it also helps 
CHAZ identify with neoliberal organisations that stress civil society’s creativity and the 
private realm.150 For CHAM, confirming a shared identity revolved around the use of biblical 
imagery. In its 2015 report, CHAM compared itself to the Old Testament character of Daniel, 
a leader whom God rewarded for his integrity: ‘As we commit this report to the CHAM 
family and partners, we are drawn to the image of Daniel.... his enemies sought to find fault 
in him, but could not find any “because he was trustworthy and neither corrupt nor negligent” 
(Dan. 6:4)’. The reference to God’s reward for the honest person reminds readers of a shared 
foundation among local and international FBOs.151  
 Both CHAM and CHAZ emphasise that their unique spiritual calling makes them 
accountable to God, in contrast to the secular state. For example, at the conference of 
ACHAP in 2015 the CHAM Secretariat spoke of CHAM’s ‘Biblical mandate’ in contrast to 
the government’s ‘Constitutional obligation’.152 Donors spoke about how this commitment 
made them trust CHAZ’s work – they were an organization that ‘walked the walk’.153 Their 
executives had chosen to work for these organization because of their Christian commitment 
to ‘serving the poor and underprivileged’.154 Donors illustrated a certain amount of 
willingness to see things through CHAZ’s perspective and to search for common ground, 
possibly because even among secular organisations, many Zambian staff were Christian.155  
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Trust as the expression of shared identities plays a vital role in the power-trust cycle. 
Where local actors – such as CHAZ - are effective in harnessing the discursive power of 
neoliberal practices they become trusted partners to donors and this brings more discretion 
over resources and projects. However, crucial in the relations examined here is how FBOs 
draw on the normative power of shared religious and ethical beliefs, to build deeper faith-
based identification, which is in turn fundamental to extending various powers.  
 
Dual identification as knowledge brokers  
Trust as identification also emerged as the two organisations translated knowledge between 
epistemic and counter-epistemic communities. As ‘knowledge brokers’156 navigating between 
biomedical (secular) approaches and holistic (spiritual) approaches to health, these FBOs 
cultivated trust with donors through a shared identity as practitioners of modern medicine and 
with locals through a shared cultural and religious identity. They reflected the epistemic 
power of biomedical expertise in their physicians and nurses, their evidence-based 
approaches, and their lengthy health care experience, all of which donors respected.157 But 
the two organizations also recognise that many of the people they serve view health 
holistically to include spiritual elements. Thus, they translate biomedical knowledge into 
arenas that locals understand and they support prayer and reading scripture as part of care.158 
One CHAZ physician explained what she told clients when they wanted to rely solely on 
prayer, not AIDS medications, for healing, ‘God gives us the medicine and His power is 
within it. Pray hard but also drink the medicine’.159 When the FBOs emphasize these spiritual 
messages, they deepen trust as identification with clients, many of whom seem to respect 
their emphasis on compassionate care and God’s power.160 Their spiritual messages also 
deepen trust as identification with faith-based donors.  
Being a knowledge broker necessitates negotiating and mediating between 
communities. At times, donors and locals may distrust brokers, particularly if these 
intermediaries seem to prioritize their own needs.161 In our cases, sometimes the FBOs had 
divided loyalties, requiring deft maneuvering to please all.162 For example, early in its days as 
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a Global Fund recipient, CHAZ felt pressure from its church members to provide them with 
grants. Yet, it had to be financially accountable, and some of its church affiliates ‘just did not 
have the capacity to write a report or keep a spending ledger’.163 CHAZ could not give grants 
to low-capacity partners, but, as one church official who worked closely with churches on 
AIDS programmes said, some of these local partners questioned why, since they were 
compassionately meeting a community need.164 These grassroots organisations’ lack of 
capacity for financial accounting (a form of epistemic power) undermined CHAZ’s ability to 
exercise discretion. Yet, as indicated above, CHAZ over time translated knowledge to local 
partners through providing them with training on financial management, indicating how 
brokers continuously jockey for opportunities as they build trust as identification.165   
 A focus on FBOs exposes how trust as belonging is complicated where actors are 
embedded in bi-directional relations of trust and identification: in this case with both donors 
and local communities. This bi-directional identification can be leveraged by the FBOs and 
other local actors to underpin their epistemic, institutional and network power in a positive 
power-trust cycle.  
 
Trust as identification and network power  
Trust as identification is linked to network power, or the ways that personal, informal 
connections affect government, donor, and FBO dynamics. Many donor, FBO and 
government personnel have attended the same schools and worked for other organisations in 
the health sector.166 For example, prior to 2014 the Director of CHAM worked for the MoH-
M and the National AIDS Council, which gave him strong informal ties to government 
despite the aforementioned breakdown in formal relations.167 In addition, some donors are 
nationals or married to local people and part of their networks.168 Building trust as 
identification through networks may be more difficult between international donors and 
locals; because some donor personnel shift from post to post across countries, they cannot 
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easily forge deep relationships with local actors.169 However, these challenges seemed less 
apparent with CHAZ and CHAM and their international FBO partners, and there was a 
striking sense of ‘in group’ among these actors that respondents conveyed and we observed. 
FBO officials referred to mutual friends that work at other FBOs throughout the world; they 
mentioned the faith-based health conferences they attend and their membership in groups like 
Christian Connections in International Health. Some discussed their education (or their 
children’s education) at Christian universities abroad (e.g. Wheaton College-Illinois). Even 
for individuals with no prior direct experiences with each other, they seemed willing to give 
each other the benefit of the doubt because of their connections to this faith community.170  
These informal relations can enable manoeuvering within formal relations and can 
undergird institutional power in a virtuous cycle. However, they also may create an in-group 
identity that leads some to distrust those outside of the group, and vice versa. Although space 
prevents analysis of the issue, this lack of trust as identification has been apparent in HIV 
prevention programs, in which faith-based actors (both donors and locals) have felt under 
attack for their emphasis of abstinence and monogamy approaches,171 while secular (and 
some religious) groups have felt similarly for their attention to condom distribution.172 The 
limited identification between these in-groups can inhibit trust. 
 
Transformation of the power-trust cycle 
For CHAZ, economic, institutional, epistemic, and normative power deepened trust as 
discretion, giving CHAZ the competence to achieve an ‘unbroken record of 
accomplishment’, empowering it to meet its commitments and enabling further discretion and 
influence.173 For example, CHAZ successfully lobbied the government for a fee waiver for 
foreign medical volunteers in Zambia if they affiliate with CHAZ.174 This action benefited 
hundreds of Christians from high-income countries who travel annually with FBOs to Zambia 
on medical missions. The policy change increased the organization’s epistemic power (it 
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could bring more experts), its economic power (it could get more faith-based donor support), 
and its normative power (it could provide more health services). It also reinforced trust as 
identification between CHAZ and FBO donors such as World Vision that sponsor medical 
missions. By successfully integrating the dual faces of trust as belonging, CHAZ can shape 
Zambia’s discourse on health as a partner with donors. One official, reflecting a broad 
sentiment within CHAZ, explained that some donors ‘have taken our goals, looked at the 
strategic plan for the nation and our own plan and based priorities on those’.175 By shaping 
the debate and defining the possibilities for health in Zambia, CHAZ exhibits the power to 
affect what others think and do. CHAZ problematises the notion that power and dependency 
only operate in one direction, from the donor to the local actor. 
 In contrast, CHAM illustrates that power and trust may intertwine in a vicious cycle. 
At the time of fieldwork, donors showed limited trust in CHAM, and the organisation 
acknowledged that donors viewed it to have a damaged reputation (weak normative 
power).176 Donors provided relatively few resources directly to CHAM, as shown in Global 
Fund disbursements. Of Malawi’s 13 grants (a total of USD 711 million), none went to 
CHAM as a principal recipient.177 Low levels of trust undermined CHAM’s economic power 
by limiting access to resources. The resulting low capacity and the perception of limited 
competence for meeting obligations eroded epistemic power, and CHAM’s reliance on DfID 
to help with financial management partly illustrates this gap. Normative and institutional 
powers also could not support trust as discretion because CHAM lacked a positive reputation 
with state officials and could not fully meet the community’s demand for care. Unmet 
obligations undermined any accumulation of the powers that undergird trust as discretion.  
Despite these challenges, CHAM shows how trust as identification may create new 
opportunities to gain various forms of power. Through highlighting shared beliefs and 
commitments, as well as personal connections, trust as identification enabled CHAM to begin 
to repair some donor relations after 2014. CHAM’s faith-based orientation helped it to point 
to shared values and forge ties with Norwegian Church Aid and Danish Church Aid, while its 
embrace of neoliberal practices facilitated ties to USAID in a positive trust cycle.  It also 
secured new project funding from the European Commission and a second award from the 
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for 2015-2019. One CHAM secretariat 
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official highlighted that some donors were prepared to ‘give CHAM the benefit of the doubt 
so CHAM can rebuild reputation by giving small amounts of money’.178 That is, they were 
willing to take a first trusting step based on intangible elements such as common values and 
emerging friendships. In the process, they illustrated an empathy for the other that undergirds 
trust as identification.179 This was partly possible because DfID invested in CHAM’s capacity 
building through trainings, and its consultants who worked closely with CHAM staff over 
several years developed a shared interest in helping the organisation to succeed. Trust as 
identification helped to begin rebuilding trust as discretion.  
CHAM’s improved situation illustrates that the trust-power cycle in donor-local 
relations need not be static. It can be transformed when donors exercise trust as discretion and 
when they strive to align their objectives with local interests. 180 Trust as identification can 






The interaction between trust and power has been neglected in both the IR and global health 
literatures and yet our research has shown that this interaction is fundamental for global 
health systems, impacting the possibilities for cooperation between multiple health actors, 
with implications for health outcomes. While previous work has often placed trust and power 
as functional equivalents, treating them as different means to elicit cooperation, we examine 
how trust and power can interact in asymmetric power relations. In doing so, we recognise 
that dependency is not simply the outcome of trust but can be a context in which trust is both 
possible and necessary. Although donors have compulsory power in their relations with local 
actors through control over funding - placing these relationships outside of the purview of 
trust by standard IR accounts – trust is still important in circumstances of dependency. We 
argue this literature must recognise the role of ‘trust as belonging’ to account for how 
common identification (shared identities) complements trust as an exercise of discretion (over 
resources and decisions) in complex relations of dependency.  
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We extend the IR literature on trust and the global health literature on power by 
developing the concept of the ‘power-trust cycle’ to account for the complexity of how 
various forms of power compound and ameliorate actors’ different, shifting vulnerabilities 
and undergird the competencies that matter for trust; and how trust, in turn, can augment 
various forms of power. Leveraging this trust as belonging successfully, we contend, can 
enable local actors to harness different types of power in an effort to offset and mediate the 
hegemonic power of neoliberalism. This, in turn, extends trust in a virtuous power-trust 
cycle. Conversely, actors who lack trust find it more difficult to harness alternative means of 
managing global imbalances of power, a pattern that then deepens distrust in a vicious power-
trust cycle.  
The trust-power cycle in donor-local relations is not static or immutable. It can be 
transformed through conscious donor-local efforts to nurture trust as belonging: when actors 
make requests for trust; when donors take a leap of faith and give local actors discretion over 
resources and projects; and where donors strive to align their objectives with local interests. 
Common identification can provide important foundations for donors and locals to build 
long-term equitable professional relationships. Strategies include coordinating donor action 
around locally determined plans, building long-term professional relationships that transfer 
skills (instead of one-off training sessions), and adopting longer project cycles that foster 
opportunities to recognise shared values.181 Such strategies also can build trust, for they give 
actors the space, time, and equal footing on which to recognise commonalities and nurture 
personal relations.  
The power-trust cycle, and the recognition that trust includes both discretion and 
identification, must be taken seriously in debates about local capacity and institution building, 
issues that permeate all Sustainable Development Goals.182 In particular, we challenge donors 
firstly to embrace a multi-faceted view of trust that moves beyond a trust-building agenda 
that focuses narrowly on transparency and accountability.183 There are multiple risks when 
donors and locals embark on a new project, and minimizing these risks often requires the 
other element of trust—trust as identification. That is, donors must be willing to act on those 
intangible, relational elements that move beyond adopting neoliberal communities of practice 
but often make achieving outcomes possible. Secondly, donors must recognise the 
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complexity of the trust-power cycle so as to acknowledge that a lack of various forms of 
power —not a lack of desire—may undermine trust. For example, even if an organisation 
wants to keep transparent financial records, without sufficient economic power to hire well-
trained accountants, it cannot do so. Recognising the complexity of power and trust would 
open possibilities for greater engagement with the very low-capacity organizations that local 
communities rely on and trust. Finally, more nuanced views of power-trust linkages would 
encourage donors to adopt strategies to invest in relationships, nurture shared values, and 
foster common objectives—all actions needed to foster the trust essential for achieving 
development objectives and more immediately, improving health outcomes in the COVID-19 
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